The highest and lowest form of expression
I collect tautologies. The banal forms vex me, as when a newspaper reports a general rise in prices and wages and notes that this is (or “may” be) “a sign of” inflation. If I could muster a bit of stoicism, I would chuckle at such tautologies. They are in fact intriguing, since they reveal a whole metaphysical theory: essentialism, where inflation is a kind of metaphysical force that manifests itself in rising prices and wages, when in fact inflation just is that general increase. There is no underlying essence here, just the phenomenon.
To some extent I’m actually a fan of essentialism as a folk metaphysics, the foundation of a private human world-view, but I don't want to see it assuming the guise of economics or any other social or natural science in the New York Times. They should be positivists about such phenomena.
You see this same kind of tautology a fair amount in academic writing, too, since academics are also at bottom private humans (God bless them!). It is one of my satisfactions as a practitioner of “philosophical editing” to help my clients root out this vermin.
Kierkegaard, another fan, connected tautology to religion. In Either/Or he writes, in the playful voice of his pseudonym ‘A’:
Tautology is and remains the highest principle, the highest axiom of thought. No wonder, then, that most people use it. Nor is it all that impoverished but can very well fill up a whole life. It has a jesting, witty, entertaining form—the infinite judgment. This kind of tautology is paradoxical and transcendental. Then it takes the serious, scientific, and upbuilding form. Its formula is as follows: when two quantities are equal in size to one and the same third quantity, the first two are also equal in size. This is a quantitative conclusion. This kind of tautology is particularly useful on podiums and in pulpits, where one must say a great deal.
An “infinite judgment” is that whereby you judge that a thing is the thing that it is—a recognition of its identity with itself. In a journal entry, Kierkegaard explains what this has to do with religion, when he comments on God's reply to Moses: “I am what I am.” How else could God describe himself? Some religious thinkers resort to negative theology to avoid sullying God with mundane predicates; Kierkegaard here suggests a positive theology to that same end. The only thing that can be predicated of God is identity: that he is who he is. We might add, in a very existentialist spirit, that it is only God who can say this about himself (a point I first heard the Kierkegaard scholar Pia Søltoft make). As Sartre would insist, human beings can never claim to be themselves, because they are never done evolving; at any given moment, they can make a radically free choice that explodes any categories we have put them in.
Kierkegaard remarks that we find an analogy to the divine statement in the fact that “the highest principles for all thought cannot be proven but only tautologically rephrased.” This would apply, for example, to the law of non-contradiction—that nothing can be both true and false; or that nothing can be both x and not-x. This law must be taken as an axiom, a foundation of all thought and all predication. If we tried to prove its truth, we would have to presuppose the law itself to do so, making the proof impotent.
Here as everywhere, Kierkegaard adds, “the highest and the lowest have a similarity; for tautology is the lowest form of expression, it is gibberish—and then again it is the highest, so that by comparison everything other than a tautology would be gibberish.” This makes me think of what my advisor Karsten Harries said once: that in one sense, the measure of whether you know what a word means is that you can define it or give a synonym. But in another sense, you know that you know what a word means when you cannot express it in any way except by repeating that very word.

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